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The	risk	of	de-risking:	the	impact	of
counterproductive	financial	measures	on	the
humanitarian	response	to	the	Syrian	crisis
(Stuart	is	a	member	of	the	Conflict	Research	Programme’s	Advisory	Board).
After	9/11	many	western	states	passed	enhanced	counter-terrorist	legislation	leading	to	the	rise	of	a	little	known	but
incredibly	powerful	organisation	called	the	Financial	Action	Task	Force	(FATF).	It	produced	a	series	of
recommendations	on	how	to	restrict	counter-terror	financing.	One	of	the	recommendations	identified	(despite	the
lack	of	any	real	empirical	information)	the	private	voluntary	sector	as	especially	vulnerable	to	manipulation	by
terrorist	organisations;	potentially	established	by	prescribed	individuals,	acting	as	a	front	for	terrorist	linked
organisations	or	subject	to	manipulation	in	fragile	and	conflict-affected	states.	This	recommendation	caused	a	ripple
effect	through	national	regulatory	structures	and	led	to	a	market	restructuring	in	the	financial	sector.	Many	banks
looked	seriously	at	the	risks	that	they	were	facing	by	working	with	organisations	that	could	be	manipulated	by
terrorist	organisations.	Facing	increasing	fines	and	the	added	pressure	of	working	with	NGOs,	the	risk	was	not
worth	the	potential	reward.	Fearing	regulatory	costs	and	fines,	they	increasingly	limited	their	business	with
humanitarian	organisations.	They	did	this	in	two	ways.	Many	banks	shed	NGO	customers,	closing	their	accounts
with	little	warning	and	no	redress.	Correspondent	banks	were	also	even	more	rigorous,	blocking	the	movement	of
money	to	conflict-affected	areas.	This	is	what	is	now	referred	to	as	the	de-risking	phenomenon.
The	humanitarian	response	to	the	Syrian	crisis	has	been	particularly	affected	by	de-risking	in	many	ways.	In
particular:
1.	 NGOs’	ability	to	cooperate	with	businesses/donors	in	the	USA	and	Western	Europe	has	been	hindered	as	the
financial	due	diligence	required	was	not	seen	as	worth	the	potential	reward.	Many	NGOs	have	had	their	bank
accounts	closed	and	have	found	it	difficult	to	move	money	to	offices	working	in	conflict	states.
2.	 Since	correspondent	banks,	which	deal	with	such	transfers,	are	more	vulnerable	to	fines	and	costs,	they	have
instituted	even	more	rigorous	measures.	As	result,	the	transfer	of	money	to	conflict-affected	regions	has
become	increasingly	difficult.
3.	 The	humanitarian	financial	space	has	been	closed	down	and	banks/financial	regulators	are	now	having	a
profound	and	unprecedented	effect,	shaping	the	distribution	of	humanitarian	aid.
Another	issue	that	emerges	is	how	such	financial	regulations	have	reframed	citizens	in	the	global	south	not	as
beneficiaries	of	assistance	or	victims	of	crisis,	but	as	contributors	to	global	risk.	Populations	that	have	traditionally
fallen	outside	of	western	state	power	have	been	rendered	governable	by	state	institutions	in	the	global	north.
But	when	the	policy	makers	are	faced	with	this,	the	usual	response	is	“but	we	have	no	empirical	evidence	that	the
Syrian	crisis	is	affected	by	bank	de-risking”.	In	response,	we	started	a	research	project	to	address	the	question	of
whether	bank	de-risking	has	affected	the	NGO	community	responding	to	the	Syrian	crisis.	We	asked	whether	there
is	evidence	of	a	precautionary	approach	to	risk	arising	from	bank	de-risking	and	permeating	NGO	humanitarian
decision-making	for	the	Syrian	humanitarian	crisis.	And	if	so,	is	this	used	to	render	beneficiaries	and/or
humanitarian	institutions	governable?	And	reflecting	the	possibility	that	a	precautionary	approach	to	risk
undermines	organisational	responses,	does	the	management	of	risk	lead	to	improved	or	reduced	humanitarian
outcomes	and	is	it	possible	to	identify	the	ways	in	which	calculations	of	risk	determine	humanitarian	priorities	and
coverage?
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The	Bank	of	Syria	and	Overseas,	one	of	the	few	private	banks	that	still	operates	inside	Syria.
Banks	inside	Syria	were	hit	by	both	sanctions	and	de-risking.	Photo	credit:	Tarek	Kebaisy.
The	main	results	were	published	in	Gordon	et	al.,	20181.	The	research	used	mixed	methodology,	largely	qualitative
in	nature,	involving	11	round-tables	and	a	survey	with	297	responses.	The	results	of	this	study	showed	that	the	de-
risking	phenomenon	has	led	to	the	following	main	problems:
1.	 Providers	of	humanitarian	aid	were	under	pressure	to	conform	to	regulations	before	responding	to	crises	in
certain	areas,	out	of	fear	of	being	de-risked	or	de-banked.
2.	 Almost	a	third	of	all	money	destined	for	Syria	was	held	in	an	almost	permanent	limbo	because	of	blockages	in
the	correspondent	banking	system.
3.	 The	risk	of	being	de-risked	creates	a	ripple	effect;	the	result	was	the	funnelling	of	humanitarian	activity	to
areas	that	were	most	likely	to	get	through	donor	and	bank	scrutiny.	This	meant	that	areas	that	were	more
marginalised	and	in	need	found	themselves	bereft	of	support.	Humanitarians	felt	they	had	to	identify	the	areas
they	responded	to	in	line	with	regulatory	requirements.	They	had	to	predict	who	they	were	dealing	with	in
terms	of	logistics	chains	and	partners.	Any	community	that	did	not	have	this	level	of	legibility	and	transparency
was	too	dangerous	to	engage	with,	because	once	banks	discovered	the	engagement,	there	was	a	danger	that
the	humanitarian	organisation	would	be	de-risked	or	de-banked.
4.	 In	the	case	of	rapid	changes	such	as	forced	displacement,	NGOs	found	it	really	hard	to	respond	because	of
the	reporting	problems	and	because	of	the	need	to	rapidly	move	money	to	those	areas.	They	would	do	this
out	of	their	own	tight	budget.
5.	 It	caused	a	shift	from	cash	response	to	outdated	commodity-based	responses,	which	could	itself	be
manipulated	or	diverted	by	combatants.
6.	 Intensifying	regulatory	measures	led	to	a	counter-productive	regime.
7.	 The	identified	risk	increases	closer	to	beneficiaries	along	the	humanitarian	supply	chain.	This	has	left	smaller
NGOs	that	are	closer	to	the	affected	areas	more	vulnerable	to	de-risking	procedures	and	therefore	more
financially	drained.
8.	 De-risking	led	to	conservative	and	unresponsive	programming	choices.	For	a	winterisation	programme,
organisations	bid	for	the	funding	six	months	in	advance	and	their	funding	is	held	up	for	six	months.	The
programme	is	then	out	of	date	so	they	shift	to	something	else;	they	are	under	pressure	to	spend	the	money
rapidly	and	therefore	choose	something	that	is	conservative	and	not	necessarily	the	most	effective	use	of
money.
Another	issue	that	emerged	is	how	the	risk	was	used	by	neighbouring	states	(such	as	Turkey)	as	a	way	of
constructing	objects	capable	of	being	governed	and	manipulated	by	the	Turkish	administration.
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The	results	reaffirmed	the	fact	that	contrary	to	the	idea	of	risk-based	management	and	results-based	management,
which	suggest	that	everything	can	be	reduced	to	probabilities	and	managed	accordingly	(managerial	logic),	one	of
the	predictions	of	risk	sociology	is	that	regulatory	failure	is	highly	likely	to	emerge	out	of	efforts	to	regulate	risk.	The
outcome	is	that	policy	makers	are	equally	likely	to	create	regulatory	failure	as	they	intensify	the	regulation	of	NGO
financing	as	they	were	to	address	the	problem	they	were	dealing	with.	Risks	in	that	process,	the	diversion	of	money
in	this	case,	were	substantially	higher	than	before	the	regulatory	process	began:	an	unanticipated	repercussion.
In	conclusion,	donors	underestimated	the	scale	of	the	problem	of	de-risking	large	Europe-based	NGOs.	And	while
the	FATF	believed	the	regulations	would	lead	to	more	transparency,	the	results	of	the	de-risking	are	that	100	per
cent	of	NGOs	operating	in	Syria	use	cash	transfers	or	the	informal	hawala	system.	Syrian	NGOs	have	also	become
overly	dependent	on	western	NGOs,	intensifying	the	sense	that	the	global	humanitarian	system	is	an	extension	of
western	political	institutions.
[1]	Gordon,	S.,	Robinson,	A.,	Goulding,	H.	&	Mahyub,	R.	2018.	The	impact	of	Bank	de-risking	on	the	humanitarian
response	to	the	Syrian	crisis.	HPG	Working	papers.
Note:	The	CRP	blogs	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	the	Conflict	Research	Programme,	the
London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	or	the	UK	Government.
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